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On 21 July 2005 China adopted an undisclosed basket exchange rate regime. We formally 
assess and envisage the gradual evolution of the renminbi over time. We utilize nonlinear 
dependencies in the renminbi exchange rate and describe the smooth transition of the ren-
minbi/U.S. dollar (RMB/USD) exchange rate using the family of time-varying autoregres-
sive (TV-AR) models. Specifically, the nonlinear models allow for a smooth transition 
from one optimal level to another. Our estimation results imply that the RMB/USD ex-
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Heinäkuun 21. päivänä Kiina otti käyttöön valuuttakorin, jonka sisältöä ei ole paljastettu. 
Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan renminbin arvon muutoksia uuden järjestelmän käyt-
töönoton jälkeen. Tutkimme renminbin ja Yhdysvaltain dollarin välisen valuuttakurssin 
epälineaarisia muutoksia käyttämällä ajassa muuttuvia autoregressiivisiä (TV-AR) malleja. 
Epälineaaristen mallien avulla voimme mallintaa kurssin siirtymisen optimaaliselta tasol-
taan toiselle. Estimointitulostemme mukaan renminbin ja Yhdysvaltain dollarin välinen 
kurssi olisi noin tasolla 7.42 vuoden 2008 kesällä tai syksyllä. 
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“An Economist … is an expert who will know tomorrow why 
the things he predicted yesterday did not happen today. This 
is especially true of currency forecasting.” 
 
The Economist, February 25th 1995, p. 19 
 
1  Introduction 
 
One issue which has been the subject of intensive debate among academic economists and 
politicians alike is the Renminbi (RMB) exchange rate. On July 21, 2005, after more than a 
decade of pegging the renminbi to the U.S. dollar (USD) at an exchange rate of 8.277, the 
People´s Bank of China (PBoC) announced a revaluation of the currency, together with a 
reform of the exchange rate regime.
1 In the new regime, the PBoC manages the RMB 
against an undisclosed basket of currencies of the main trading partners.
2 Although critics 
were not impressed with the initial 2.1 percent appreciation of the RMB to 8.11 per USD, 
much initial excitement surrounded the Chinese pledge to link the RMB to a group of ma-
jor currencies. Many economists have argued that the modest RMB revaluation merely 
marks the beginning of a more significant evolution of the currency regime which could 
translate into a major upward revaluation if the RMB in accordance with market forces. 
Concerns about China´s competitive threat as a global production place are wide-
spread in both advanced and emerging economies. For a start, the large bilateral U.S.-
China trade deficit has led to American pressure to revalue the RMB. Above and beyond 
this pressure, the U.S. has been joined by the international community, including the G-8 
and the IMF, in encouraging China to implement greater exchange rate flexibility, which 
would most likely be associated with a larger RMB appreciation. Greater flexibility in 
China’s exchange rate is viewed as an essential element of a global response to the large 
macroeconomic imbalances in the world economy.  
In East Asia there are concerns that China´s industrialisation - underpinned by 
cheap labour - devalues manufacturing assets outside China. This concern stems from the 
fact that the current hollowing out of their low-end manufacturing trade in third markets, as 
well as their trade with China, may soon extend to more complex production processes. 
                                                 
1 The terms “renminbi” and “yuan” are generally used interchangeably to refer to China´s currency. The 
renminbi is the currency, while the yuan is the unit of account.  
2 This poses a problem in that the announcement and subsequent clarifications leave the Chinese central bank 
with considerable discretion over its renminbi target. Funke and Rahn (2005) have estimated that the equilib-
rium renminbi exchange rate against the U.S. dollar is undervalued by 10-15 percent, while Cheung et al. 
(2007) have found that once serial correlation and uncertainty is accounted for, there is little statistical evi-
dence that the renminbi is undervalued. A survey of the literature is provided by Dunaway et al. (2006). Michael Funke and Marc Gronwald 
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Gaulier et al. (2007) have demonstrated that, since the emergence of China, Asian trade 
has become increasingly centred on China – a development largely driven by the interna-
tional segmentation of production processes. Lall and Albaladejo (2004) have analysed ex-
ports disaggregated according to technological content in order to gain a deeper under-
standing of China´s changing competitive edge vis à vis its neighbours. Their work has 
yielded the well-documented insight that China has boosted intra-regional trade. Further-
more they have shown that the Asian countries differ greatly in their industrial capabilities 
and that the competitive threat facing each country therefore differs greatly. With appro-
priate restructuring, most countries will be able to match China´s export surge and main-
tain high rates of export growth. The real threat is to the less technologically advanced Ti-
gers that have much higher wages than China but lack the domestic capabilities to climb up 
the quality ladder.
3 
A substantial literature has emerged examining the de facto currency regimes which are 
currently in operation [see Calvo and Reinhart (2002)]. Given this literature, our paper seeks to ad-
dress questions such as (i) what is the nature of the current RMB exchange rate regime? (ii) Is a 
basket in operation and if yes, what are the weights of the various currencies? (iii) How can we en-
visage the gradual evolution of the de facto currency regime towards a new equilibrium?  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the new RMB 
basket peg. Section 3 discusses the de facto currency regime in operation using a rule-of-thumb 
framework. In Section 4 we exploit the time-varying TV-AR family of models which is suitable for 
describing the evolution of regimes with a smooth transition. Section 5 summarizes the findings 
and concludes with some general remarks. 
 
 
2  How does the new renminbi peg work? 
 
The Chinese basket peg replaces the obligation to hold the RMB exchange rate within a 
fixed margin of the USD with an obligation to hold the RMB within a fixed margin of a 
constant nominal value of a basket of currencies. On 10 August 2005, three weeks after 
China abandoned its decade-old peg to the USD, the PBoC revealed the mix of this bas-
ket.
4 However, the weights attached to each currency were not revealed.
5 According to the 
                                                 
3 A theoretical variety expansion growth model allowing for industrial hollowing-out has recently been pre-
sented by Kim (2007). According to the model, due to China´s increasing “experience capital” the Asian 
countries will experience an industrial hollowing-out unless they are able to switch to more technology-
intensive products and exports.     
4 Singapore, which has operated a similar system since the 1980s, has never taken such a step. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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PCoC, the US dollar (USD), the Japanese yen (JPY), the euro (EUR) and the South Korean 
won (KRW) have the largest weights, but the basket also includes the currencies of Austra-
lia (AUD), Canada (CAD), Great Britain (GBP), Malaysia (MYR), Russia (RUB), Singa-
pore (SQD), and Thailand (THB). Given the political problems this might pose, the Hong 
Kong and Taiwanese dollars are absent. The choice of currencies (and hence presumably 
the weights), depends not only on the pattern of China's trade but also on the sources of its 
foreign direct investment and the currency composition of its reserves.  
The operation of the new system involves the daily calculation of a new central par-
ity (“medium value” in the gap/band).
6 Initially the trading range was monitored and con-
trolled at ± 0.15% around this medium value for the USD, with different ranges for other 
currencies (perhaps 0.5-1% for EUR and JPY).
7 On 18 May 2007, the PBoC eventually 
widened the RMB´s daily trading band against the USD from 0.30% to 0.50%.
8  
There are several similarities between the Chinese system and Singapore´s basket 
system. Singapore adopted its basket approach in 1981 and it was seen as a halfway house 
between fixed and flexible currencies. Notable similarities between the two systems in-
clude the following: (i) Both countries link their currency to a basket of major currencies; 
(ii) both have a central parity and a moving band, and finally (iii) Singapore does not re-
veal exactly how its basket of currencies is constructed, an approach China appears to be 
emulating. The motivation is to ward off speculators. On the other hand, there is no capital 
control in Singapore and therefore no need to publish the official central parity. The band 
for Singapore is announced semi-annually. Singapore's Monetary Authority intervene at 
their own discretion to maintain the central parity and the band. The PBoC publishes the 
central parity every evening (necessitated by the fact that they have capital control and 
RMB is not freely tradable).  
                                                                                                                                                 
5 The obvious disadvantage of the undisclosed basket peg therefore is a lack of transparency. Markets may 
become flustered about what may happen next. 
6 Consider a simple example: Assume that the basket just contains the USD and the EUR with weights of  
70% and 30%, respectively. On July 22 (as announced on July 21 evening), the rate is 1 USD = 8.11 RMB 
and 1 EUR = 9.81 RMB (because 1 EUR = 1.21 USD), to get 8.11 RMB you need USD 0.70 and EUR 
0.30/1.21. During the day RMB/USD is allowed to trade at 8.11 ± 0.012. When recalculating the exchange 
rate, the PBoC will take the spot price of USD and EUR. If, for example, the EUR/USD = 1.19, then the new 
central parity for USD/RMB will become [8.11×0.70 + 9.81×(1/1.19)×0.30] = 8.15. The corresponding new 
EUR/RMB central parity is then 8.15×1.19 = 9.70. During day trade, PBoC will defend the exchange rate for 
the USD within the ± 0.015% band. 
7 PBoC have also stressed that they only “reference” a basket formula and that they have the discretion to not 
follow the formula strictly. 
8 The widening of the band may be a token gesture and may not indicate a policy change leading to a faster 
appreciation of the Renminbi. The reason is that the renminbi never hit its previous trading limits, so even 
within the tighter band it could have appreciated faster. Michael Funke and Marc Gronwald 
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The basket is likely to be heavily dominated by the USD. Using China’s trade 
weights, a four currency basket would have the following weights: USD (50%), JPY 
(20%), EUR (15%), and KRW (10%). The hard dollar pegs (USD and HKD) therefore ac-
count for close to 50% of the basket. If one considers the JPY as a soft USD peg, the 
weight on the dollar could be as high as 80%. This means that the RMB/USD will still be 
very “compliant”, with the index being “sticky” relative to the USD. 
The development of the RMB/USD exchange rate since July 2005 is plotted in Fig-
ure 1. Since departing from its USD peg at 21 July 2005, the RMB has gradually appreci-
ated – albeit by incremental margins – moving from its original parity of 8.11 RMB/USD 
to about 7.6 RMB/USD as of late June 2007.   
 
Figure 1: Daily China – U.S. foreign exchange rate (RMB/USD) 
 
Note: All daily exchange rates were obtained from the Pacific Exchange Rate Service 
 (see http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/). 
 
The conventional wisdom is that the Renminbi has not moved much since the PBoC 
adopted the new regime in July 2005. This may be interpreted as a gradual policy approach 
trying to avoid slashing the RMB value of central bank reserves. In the next section we 
therefore track the (time-varying) weightings of the currencies in the basket.  
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3  A standard monitoring procedure 
 
We begin by calculating the de facto RMB currency regime that has been in place since 
July 2005 using a linear regression model that measures the relationship between daily 
changes in cross-currency rates. In order to monitor the new RMB basket peg system, we 
first employ the easy-to-use Haldane and Hall (1991) and Frankel and Wei (2007) method-
ology which has been used extensively in the exchange rate literature. Formally, the esti-
mated model can be expressed as follows: 
 
(1) 
, , / 11 , / 10 , / 9
, / 8 , / 7 , / 6 , / 5
, / 4 , / 3 , / 2 , / 1 0 , /
ε δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ
t t k THB t k SQD t k RUB
t k MYR t k GBP t k CAD t k AUD
t k KRW t k EUR t k JPY t k USD t k RMB
E E E
E E E E
E E E E E
+ Δ + Δ + Δ +
Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ +
Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ + = Δ
 
 
where the exchange rate data consists of the log-level daily spot prices (Ei/k,t) and Δ is the 
first-difference operator.
9 The numeraire currency k used here is the Swiss Franc because 
the Swiss Franc is known to be a clean floating exchange rate. The OLS estimation results 
with robust standard errors are given in Table 1 below. The error term appears to have a 
fat-tailed distribution relative to the normal distribution, i.e. large changes tend to be fol-
lowed by large changes, and small changes tend to follow small changes.
10 Therefore, we 
have also estimated a conditional GARCH-in-mean model specification where the condi-
tional variance takes the form  
 
(2)  h h t t t 1 2
2
1 1 0 − − + + = β ε β β . 
 
The two cases of interest are: Peg to the USD: When the RMB is still pegged to the USD, 
then δ1 is close to 1 and  δ2 = δ3 = ... = δ11 = 0. 
                                                 
9 The daily series represent changes between business days with no adjustment for holidays. 
10 Conditional heteroscedasticity in nominal exchange rate residuals is a well-known feature of daily ex-
change rate data that tends to vanish at lower frquencies due to time aggregation. With heteroscedasticity, the 
OLS estimator is still unbiased and consistent but it is not BLUE or asymptotically efficient. When hetero-
scedasticity is mild, OLS standard errors behave quite well [Long and Ervin 2000)]. However, when hetero-
scedasticity is severe, ignoring it may bias the standard errors. The direction of the bias depends on the pat-
tern of heteroscedasticity: standard errors may be too large or too small. Usually, heteroscedasticity is a nui-
sance that cannot be modeled because its source is not well understood. In this case, a classic correction for 
heteroscedasticity is the HC0 estimator proposed by White (1980). But although this estimator is correct in 
large samples, it is no better than OLS in small samples. MacKinnon and White (1985) discussed three im-
provements, HC1, HC2, and HC3. The evaluation by Long and Ervin (2000) suggests that HC3 is the best, 
especially in small samples. Michael Funke and Marc Gronwald 
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(i)  Basket peg: If instead a basket peg is in operation, then the coefficients δ1 = δ2 = ... = δ11 would 
turn out to be positive and significant. 
 
The estimation results using high-frequency daily data for the period 26 July 2005 to 13 
August 2007 are given in Table 1. As shocks to the mean equation are the main actors in 
the multivariate framework, it is important that the mean equation is not misspecified. The 
final specification of the mean equation and the lag structure has been chosen using infor-
mation criteria. Furthermore, LM-tests for autocorrelation have been performed. The diag-
nostic tests fail to detect any autocorrelation, thereby suggesting that there is little unex-
plained dependence in the data. The ARCH tests performed on the squared residuals turn 
out insignificant, which indicates that the GARCH(1,1) model does a good job of tracking 
the strong temporal dependence in the variance.  
 
Table 1  Estimating the implicit basket weights 
 OLS GARCH(1,1) 
  Estimates Prob-values Estimates Prob-values 
USD  0.933 0.0001 0.920 0.0001 
EUR  -0.034 0.1229 -0.024 0.2010 
JPY  0.018 0.0447 0.017 0.0436 
KRW  0.029 0.0067 0.022 0.0161 
SQD  -0.007 0.7190 -0.013 0.4699 
GBP  0.019 0.0997 0.015 0.1729 
MYR  0.028 0.1907 0.044 0.0086 
RUB  0.013 0.4321 0.028 0.0612 
AUD  0.004 0.5847 0.002 0.7567 
THB  -0.006 0.1602 -0.010 0.0239 
CAD  -0.010 0.2424 -0.007 0.3445 
Constant  -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
      
   Conditional Variance Equation 
β0  - -  0.000  0.5057 
β1  - -  0.092  0.0034 
β2  - -  0.847  0.0001 
      
R-squared  0.98 - 0.98 - 
        
Diagnostics:  Test statistics  Prob-values  Test statistics  Prob-values 
ARCH(4)  4.962 0.0006 0.593 0.6680 
ARCH(8) 2.641  0.0076  0.6728  0.7157 
ARCH(12)  2.045 0.0191 0.607 0.8365 
Note: White Heteroscedasticity-robust and Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors have been used for the 
OLS and GARCH(1,1) models, respectively. 
 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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The results indicate that the new regime has rather little flexibility. The coefficient for the 
USD is nearly one and therefore this particular Gordian knot has not yet been disentangled. 
There is weak evidence of a peg to a basket but the weights of the remaining currencies are 
very small. Despite claims to the contrary, an analysis following the principle “actions 
speak louder than words” therefore yields that policy continuity is in place in China. Alter-
natively one may say that the PBoC still has to walk the talk.
11 
The Frankel and Wei (2007) approach also allows one to trace the development of 
the de facto exchange rate system over time. In order to identify movement away from the 
USD peg towards a basket peg, we have also calculated the GARCH-in-mean specification 
as a rolling regression. The estimation results for the USD coefficient are presented in Fig-
ure 2. 
 
Figure 2 Rolling regression results for the implicit basket weight of the USD (Solid lLine)  
and ± 2 standard errors (dashed lines) 
 
  Note: The rolling regressions have been calculated using a bandwidth of 100 observations. The horizontal 
  axis gives the initial span of 100 respective observations. Qualitatively similar results are obtained for other 
 bandwidths. 
                                                 
11 One reason for the gradual approach is that the institutional constraint that an efficient and market-oriented 
FX market, which provides the needed foundation for any move towards greater exchange rate flexibility, 
still does not exist in China. China´s FX market is limited in product scope to mainly spot trading in USD. 
Interbank forward and swap transactions were finally introduced in successive reform measures in August 
2005, but the markets are shallow.   Michael Funke and Marc Gronwald 
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The overall conclusion once again is that the RMB has remained pegged to the USD, with rather 
limited currency flexibility.  
Although the Frankel and Wei (2007) approach makes intuitive sense, it has some drawbacks. In 
particular, one must bear in mind that the tests may be biased if the RMB exchange rate follows a 
nonlinear process. To measure how the previous rigid exchange rate system may be gradually 
phased out towards a more flexible exchange rate regime, we therefore additionally employ a 
smooth transition modelling approach to learn more about the smooth evolution of the currency 
regime over time.  
 
 
4  Beyond the “rule-of-thumb” framework 
 
An important feature of the previous results is the finding that the Chinese authorities have 
tried to engineer a gradual shift in the RMB exchange rate.
12 Given this gradual shift, and 
in order to shed further light on the new RMB basket, we now consider univariate time-
varying smooth transition autoregression (TV-AR and TV-AR-GARCH) models as a re-
finement and in the hope of delineating the RMB/USD pattern more accurately.
13 Our 
working hypothesis is that the de facto RMB/USD exchange rate exhibits nonlinear fea-
tures and that TV-AR models can adequately characterize the smooth nonlinear evolution 
of the Chinese exchange rate regimes.
14 An important rationale for this family of models is 
                                                 
12 While China shared many initial conditions with the transition economies of Central-East Europe (CEE) 
and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), it had a more stable political system compared to many 
CEE and CIS countries and the communist party of China rules the country as an autocrat without really im-
posing itself as such. Unlike most of the CEE and CIS economies, China nevertheless adopted a strategy of 
gradual economic transformation that maintained the existing system but created new economic activities on 
top of it. This enabled China to avoid the initial transformation slump observed in CEE and CIS countries, 
and allowed it to generate high rates of economic growth that have now lasted for almost three decades. 
Given this experience, the PBoC has stated (see 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english//detail.asp?col=6400&ID=572) it will carry the exchange rate regime reform 
forward in a gradual manner to ensure sufficient resilience of all parties involved. 
13 It would be straightforward to augment the framework to allow for further exogenous variables as addi-
tional regressors. 
14 This contrasts, for example, with the Markov regime-switching model which assumes an abrupt switch 
between regimes. Aside from potential nonlinearity, considerable research has also focused on structural 
change and time-varying parameters in time-series models. Structural breaks and parameter variation may 
occur because of institutional change, an evolving policy environment, or technological innovation. Recently, 
nonlinear models have been combined with model specifications that facilitate structural change and parame-
ter time variation. For example, Holt and Craig (2006), Lundbergh et al. (2003), Skalin and Teräsvirta 
(2002), and van Dijk et al. (2003) combine the TV-AR model of Lin and Teräsvirta (1994) with smoothly 
time-varying parameters with STAR models to obtain a time-varying STAR (TV-STAR) model which con-
siders the joint presence of nonlinearity and structural instability. Boero and Marrocu (2002) and Cao and 
Soofi (1999) have shown that nonlinear methods can be successfully employed in exchange rate prediction. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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that all the relevant information is embodied in the most recent RMB/USD central parity, 
so that is becomes unnecessary to include further variables in the set of explanatory vari-
ables.   
We first present a brief review of the methodological issues. The basic problem fac-
ing any econometrician is to determine the fundamental relationship between a dependent 
variable, ΔERMB/USD, and a vector of regressors, expressed by X. The question is how best to 
specify the functional form f{⋅} in equation (3) 
 
(3)  {}ε t t USD RMB X f E + = Δ / , 
 
where εt is the residual. The methodology used here builds on the existing STAR literature 
to investigate the gradual Chinese policy approach towards the RMB/USD exchange rate. 
We obtain a smooth line capturing “shifts” in the RMB/USD relationship and which can be 
interpreted as the smooth transition trajectory between exchange rate regimes. 
The modelling cycle, fully described by Teräsvirta (1994) and Lin and Teräsvirta (1994), 
comprises three stages. (i) We first specifiy and estimate a linear model which is tested 
against nonlinear alternatives using a battery of tests; (ii) if linearity is rejected, we specify 
and estimate the nonlinear model; and (iii) we evaluate the nonlinear model. Consider the 
return series {ΔERMB/USD,t}, regressors xit = (1, ΔERMB/USD,t-1, …., ERMB/USD,t-1)’, i = 1,2, and 
a white noise stochastic shock εt. We follow Skalin and Teräsvirta (2002) and Panos et al. 
(1997) by including the lagged level term ERMB/USD,t-1 as an explanatory variable and 
thereby allowing for the possibility of an error-correction mechanism (ECM). We expect 
the estimated coefficient of ERMB/USD,t-1 to be negative, i.e. we assume that the process is 
mean-reverting. The class of two-regime TV-AR processes is represented as 
 
(4)  ( ) ε γ φ φ t t t t c t F x x E + ′ + ′ = Δ , , 2 2 1 1 , 
 
for some transition function F(⋅): ℜ
3 → [0, 1], slope or smoothness parameter γ > 0, loca-
tion parameter c, and transition variable time t. The time index t is a short-cut which cap-
tures the gradual policy approach of the PBoC and the errors  ( ) σ ε , 0 ~ 2 NID t .  
The above specification is quite flexible, in that it embeds other paradigms as limiting 
cases. If the smoothness parameter γ and/or the vector φ2 are zero, then the process col-
lapses to a linear autoregression. As γ → ∞, the regime switch becomes a single break and Michael Funke and Marc Gronwald 
 
The undisclosed renminbi basket:  
Are the markets telling us something about 
where the renminbi - US dollar exchange rate is going? 
 
 16
therefore the TV-AR becomes a self-exciting threshold autoregression (SETAR) model 
[Tsay (1989)].
15 
In equation (4) we have been deliberately vague about the precise functional form 
F(⋅) which is sufficiently broad to encompass various parameterisations. The transition 
function has to be twice continuously differentiable in γ and c. Following the vast majority 
of applied research and to simplify the exposition, we consider the logistic function 
 






γ   
 
which allows the exchange rate to change in a possibly gradual and smooth manner. In-
stread of imposing a certain a priori view on the matter, the TV-AR model permits the data 
to determine the nature (duration and size) of the nonlinear transition process. 
Estimation of a TV-AR model involves, in principle, a straightforward application 
of nonlinear least squares. When  ( ) σ ε , 0 ~ 2 NID t  is valid, the nonlinear least squares is 
equivalent to maximum likelihood based on a Gaussian likelihood function. If 
( ) σ ε , 0 ~ 2 NID t  is not valid, then nonlinear least squares can be interpreted as quasi maxi-
mum likelihood estimates which are still consistent under suitable regularity conditions. As 
pointed out by Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta (1994, pp. 216-217), whilst 
the other parameter estimates may converge rapidly, the estimate for γ may do so only very 
slowly, particular when the true parameter value is large. Therefore, reasonable starting 
values for c and γ should be obtained from a two-dimensional grid search over possible c 
and γ  parameters.   
We first present results on the estimation of a provisional linear ECM model fitted 
to ERMB/USD. The linear model takes the form 
 
(6)  t t p t p t t bE E a E a c E ε + + Δ + + Δ + = Δ − − − 1 1 1 ... . 
 
The Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) have 
been used to determine the appropriate lag length. The best-fitting ECM and several diag-
nostics are recorded in Table 2 and 3, respectively.
16 
                                                 
15 van Dijk and Franses (1999) have generalised the STAR model by introducing further transition variables 
to obtain a multiple regime MRSTAR framework.   BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




Table 2  Lag order selection criteria 
Lag AIC  BIC 
0 -11.54553  -11.52904 
1 -11.57198  -11.54725 
2 -11.58564  -11.55268 
3 -11.58409  -11.54289 
4 -11.58163  -11.53192 
5 -11.57852  -11.52083 
Note: Both information criteria indicate an optimal lag length p = 2. 
 
Table 3  ECM parameter estimates 
Parameters Estimates  Prob-values 
c  -0.006 0.0466 
1 a   -0.198 0.0001 
2 a   -0.134 0.0028 
b   0.003 0.0527 
    
Diagnostics: Test  statistics  Prob-values 
LM(4) 0.704  0.5894 
LM(8) 0.956  0.4697 
LM(12) 1.285  0.2232 
ARCH(4) 3.566  0.0070 
ARCH(8) 2.138  0.0310 
ARCH(12) 1.748  0.0542 
JB 38.702  0.0001 
BDS(2) 0.009  0.0150 
BDS(4) 0.022  0.0025 
BDS(6) 0.028  0.0001 
Notes: LM(k) is the LM test of no remaining autocorrelation in the residuals up to and 
including lag k.  RCH(k) is the LM test of no autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
in the residuals up to and including lag k. JB is the Jarque-Bera test of normality of  the 
residuals. Finally, BDS(m) is a test for nonlinearity in a series where m is the so-called  
embedding dimension. The sample period is 7/26/2005 – 8/13/2007. 
 
The overall picture that emerges from Table 3 is one of no autocorrelation in the residuals 
but strong evidence for nonlinearity.
17 Furthermore, the hypotheses of no ARCH effects 
and normality are soundly rejected. The implication of this evidence is that estimating lin-
ear exchange rate models disregarding the presence of nonlinearity may yield misspecified 
models. As such, the results and conclusions of linear modelling approaches have to be re-
ceived with reservations.  
                                                                                                                                                 
16 The overwhelming evidence in the empirical literature is that exchange rates are nonstationary. We have 
not investigated this issue because standard unit root tests are of questionable value when nonlinear TV-AR 
models are considered. See Skalin and Teräsvirta (2002). Michael Funke and Marc Gronwald 
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Based on these preliminary results, we next fit a TV-AR and a TV-AR-GARCH 
model to the data by using nonlinear least squares.  The basic TV-AR model corresponding 
to the case k = 1 in Lin and Teräsvirta (1996, p. 214) takes the form 
 












) , (  . 
 
The parameter estimates of the TV-AR model capturing the gradual Chinese policy approach are 
given in Table 4.
18 
 
Table 4 TV-AR estimation results 
Parameters Estimates Prob-values 
κ   0.215 0.0181 
a   -0.268 0.0023 
b   -0.103 0.0181 
κ′  -0.120 0.3054 
a′   0.253 0.0958 
b′  0.055 0.3279 
γ   0.011 0.0001 
c  -451.44 0.0001 
   
Diagnostics Test  statistics Prob-values 
ARCH(4) 3.776  0.0049 
ARCH(8) 2.015  0.0429 
ARCH(12) 1.607  0.0859 
Note: Sample period: 7/26/2005 – 8/13/2007. 
 
The coefficients are statistically significant and the residual diagnostics are satisfactory ex-
cept that the ARCH tests indicate some remaining heteroscedasticity. This suggests that the 
TV-AR model has not identified all of the nonlinearities in the data. Given the apparent 
ARCH effects, the following TV-AR-GARCH(1,1) model has also been considered: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 Note, however, that the nonlinearity tests cannot actually pin down the proper form of nonlinearity. 
18 Initially we have considered the same autoregressive order as in the linear ECM. After estimating the TV-
AR and TV-AR-GARCH model, however, the second autoregressive parameters turned out to be insignifi-
cant. To enhance efficiency,  we have dropped ΔEt-2. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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The estimation results can be found in Table 5. 
 














Note: Sample period: 7/26/2005 – 8/13/2007. 
 
From Table 5 it is clear that the coefficients are statistically significant and the estimated 
transition parameter γ  appears to be significantly different from zero on the basis of the t-
Parameters Estimates Prob-values 
κ   0.198 0.2043 
a   -0.282 0.0051 
b   -0.095 0.2058 
κ′  -0.110 0.0048 
a′   0.261 0.1235 
b′  0.051 0.0082 
γ   0.010 0.0001 
c   -451.43 0.0001 
   
Conditional variance equation 
0 β   2.45E-08 0.0219 
1 β   0.068 0.0121 
2 β   0.889 0.0001 
   
Diagnostics Test  statistics Prob-values 
ARCH(4) 0.101  0.9821 
ARCH(8) 0.389  0.9268 
ARCH(12) 0.411  0.9593 Michael Funke and Marc Gronwald 
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ratio, which itself indicates significant nonlinearity.19 Consistent with the gradual Chinese 
policy approach, the small size of the point estimate of γ indicates a slow-moving transition 
from one regime to the other. In all, these results suggest that our intuition of the smooth 
TV-AR modelling framework is plausible and that the previous evidence for the linear 
Frankel and Wei (2007) modelling framework may be premature.  
Next, we analyse the implied long run (deterministic) equilibrium for the TV-AR 
model, which is plotted in Figure 3. Visual evidence suggests that the nonlinear “skeleton” 
corresponds closely with the actual exchange rate dynamics, i.e. the TV-AR model´s abil-
ity to adequately characterise the gradual appreciation is clearly visible. Based on these 
findings and assuming no further breaks in the RMB/USD exchange rate, the deterministic 
extrapolation indicates that the RMB/USD exchange rate will appreciate smoothly from 
8.09 RMB/USD, where it resided immediately after the initial appreciation in July 2005, to 
7.42 in summer/autumn 2008. 
 
Figure 3 Actual daily RMB/USD exchange rate and etimated logistic transition function 
 
                                                 
19 When interpreting the γ  parameter, one should keep in mind however that the asymptotic distribution of 
the smoothness parameter is, in any event, nonstandard under the hypothesis γ = 0. See van Dijk et al. (2002), 
pp. 19-21. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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In summary we conclude that daily RMB/USD exchange rate since the beginning of 2005 




5  Summary and some concluding thoughts 
    
This paper presents some novel empirical evidence on the new renminbi exchange rate re-
gime. Based upon the view that Chinese policy changes rarely ever take place overnight, 
we have examined the extent to which TV-AR and TV-AR-GARCH models contribute to 
our understanding of the gradual reform process underlying the new RMB exchange rate 
regime. There are several reasons to believe a priori that a TV-AR framework might be 
fruitful. First, previous research has found evidence of nonlinearities in exchange rates. 
Second, the gradual Chinese policy approach suggests a smooth transition TV-AR model. 
Third, the TV-AR approach is flexible enough to accommodate future policy changes by 
assuming a double-transition (three-regime) TV-AR model specification.  
This study has brought to the fore the observation that changes in Chinese policy 
usually take place through a series of smaller steps.
21 The much-talked-about threat under-
lying this policy approach is the fear that a sharp appreciation of the RMB could seriously 






                                                 
20 One potential problem is that nonlinearities are present but they are captured by the wrong type of nonlin-
ear model. For the sake of completeness, we have also estimated TV-AR and TV-AR-GARCH models as-
suming that the smooth transition function can be adequately approximated by a polynomial function of t up 
to order k = 3. See Lin and Teräsvirta [1994, p. 214, eq. (2)]. Again, the estimated transition parameter ap-
pears to be significantly different from zero. Furthermore, the graphical information on the nonlinear transi-
tion is identical to the k = 1 case. The results are insufficiently different to justify a separate discussion but 
they are available from the authors upon request. 
21 He Fan of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences published recently an article in „China Daily“ (2007-
08-07; see http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2007-08/07/content_5448940.htm) suggesting that China 
might sell (one day) some of its USD treasuries. He believes that the RMB should be allowed to appreciate, 
but he also clearly indicates that the U.S. should not try to dictate the pace of RMB appreciation, particularly 
given that the RMB/USB exchange rate is a key price in China’s economy. He Fan’s writings also leave no 
doubt that he understands the financial risks that China is taking by holding so many dollar-denominated 
assets. 
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Figure 4   Japan´s exchange rate and GDP growth, 1975 – 2005 
 
In many ways China today looks similar to Japan in the 1980s. Like Japan, China has high 
saving and investment shares, an export-led growth process, big current account surplus, 
and upward pressure upon its exchange rate. After the Plaza accord in the mid 1980s, the 
JPY appreciated by about 80 percent against the USD in a few years. Chinese policyma-
kers have concluded that the blame for Japan´s “lost decade” lay largely with the appre-
ciation of the JYP.22 China has therefore only allowed the RMB to rise only gradually. 
Amidst all the discussion about the RMB, one final thought is that the Chinese are 
bucking the recent trend to “move to the corners” when determining what type of exchange 
                                                 
22 It is, however, questionable whether Japan´s real mistake was the sharp appreciation of the JYP. An alter-
native perception is that the intrinsic mistake was the loose monetary policy trying to offset the impact of the 
rising JYP. This inflated the bubble and then prevented the central bank to ease monetary policy once the 
bubble had burst.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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rate regime to run.  Much recent economic literature has suggested that running intermedi-
ate exchange rate regimes, i.e. managed floats, basket pegs, crawling bands and the like, 
are too difficult to run for a country with open capital markets. Speculative pressures will 
sooner or later challenge the credibility of intermediate regimes and countries will thus be 
forced to move to the corners and adopt either full floats or hard pegs such as currency 
boards or dollarisation. Without doubt, the new exchange rate regime depends in large 
measure on China’s ability to maintain capital controls – in the absence of deep, liquid for-
eign exchange markets, traders and investors cannot bring market forces to bear against 
Chinese monetary policy. In other words, once China can no longer maintain effective 
capital controls, a flexible exchange rate regime will become more likely. Michael Funke and Marc Gronwald 
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